Towards Model-based Software Health Management for Real-Time Systems

Abhishek Dubey Gabor Karsai Nagabhushan Mahadevan

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Abhishek Dubey  Gabor Karsai  Nagabhushan Mahadevan

Institute for Software-Integrated Systems
Vanderbilt University
Nashville, TN 37203, USA

Abstract

The complexity of software systems has reached the point where we need run-time mechanisms that can be used to provide fault management services. Testing and verification may not cover all possible scenarios that a system can encounter, hence a simpler, yet formally specified run-time monitoring, diagnosis, and fault mitigation architecture is needed to increase the software system’s dependability. The approach described in this paper borrows concepts and principles from the field of ‘Systems Health Management’ for complex systems. The paper introduces the fundamental ideas for software health management, and then illustrates how these can be implemented in a model-based software development process, including a case study and related work.

1 Introduction

Core logic of functions in complex cyber-physical systems like aircraft and automobiles is increasingly being implemented in software. Similarly, software provides the system integration mechanisms: it connects various subsystems and is responsible for their coordinated operation. Software was originally used to implement subsystem-specific functions (e.g., an anti-lock braking system in cars), but today software interacts with other sub-systems as well (e.g., with the engine control or the vehicle stability system). It is self-evident that the correctness of software is essential for many system functions.

As the complexity of software increases, existing verification and testing technology can barely keep up. Novel methods based on formal (mathematical) techniques are being used for verifying critical software functions, but less critical software systems are often not subjected to the same rigorous verification. There is a high likelihood for software defects being present in systems that arise only under exceptional circumstances. These circumstances may include faults in the hardware system (including both the computing and non-computing hardware) - software is very often not prepared for hardware faults.

There is a well-established literature of software fault tolerance which carries of the techniques of hardware fault tolerance (like triple modular redundancy) to the software domain. We argue, however that software complexity has evolved to a new level where such techniques do not provide a sufficient technology anymore and new approaches are needed. While the architectural principles of software fault tolerance are clear, the complexity of anomaly detection, fault source isolation, and fault mitigation has grown to the point that by itself this has become a potential source of faults. In other words, the implementation of software fault tolerance may lead to faults.

The answer, arguably, lies in two principles: (1) the software fault management should be kept as simple as possible, and (2) the software fault management system should be built according to very strict standards - possibly automatically generated from specifications. We conjecture that these goals can be achieved if software fault management technology embraces new software development paradigms, like component-based software and model-driven development.

We argue that software fault management can and should borrow techniques from the field of system health management that deals with complex engineering systems where faults in their operation must be
detected, diagnosed, mitigated, and prognosticated. System health management typically includes the activities of anomaly detection, fault source identification (diagnosis), fault effect mitigation (in operation), maintenance (off line), and fault prognostics (on-line or off-line). The techniques of SHM are typically mathematical algorithms and engineering processes, possibly implemented on some computational system that provides health management functions for the operator, for the maintainer, and for the sustaining engineer.

The main differences between system health management and fault tolerant design has three aspects: (1) system health management deals with the entire system, not only with a single subsystem or component, (2) while fault tolerance primarily deals with abrupt, catastrophic faults, system health management operates in continuum ranging from simple anomalies through degradations to abrupt and complete faults, and (3) health management explicitly aims at predicting future faults from early precursor anomalies of those faults.

In this paper we discuss the principles of software health management, in a model-based conceptual and development framework. First we discuss the model-based approach we follow, then explain a software component model we developed, show how the model can serve for constructing component and system level health management services, and then illustrate its use through a case study. The paper concludes with a brief review of the related work and a summary.

2 Backgrounds

In the past 15 years a novel approach to the development of complex software systems has been developed and applied: model-driven development (MDD). The key idea is to use models in all phases of the development (analysis, design, implementation, testing, maintenance and evolution). This approach has been codified in two related and overlapping directions: the Model-driven Architecture (MDA) [3] of the Object Management Group (OMG), and the Model-Integrated Computing (MIC) [4] approach that our team advocates. MDD relies on the use of models that capture relevant properties of the system to be developed (e.g. requirements, architecture, behaviors, components, etc.) and uses these models in generating (or modifying) code, other engineering artifacts, etc. Perhaps the greatest success of MDD is in the field of embedded control systems and signal processing: today flight software is often developed in Simulink/Stateflow [2] or Matrix-X [5] - that implement their own flavor of MDD. Properties of MDD relevant for the goals of software health management are as follows:

1. Models represent the system, its requirements, its components, and their behavior, and these models capture the designer’s knowledge of the system.
2. Models are, in essence, higher-level programs that influence many details of the implementation.
3. Models could be available at operation time, i.e. embedded in the running system.
4. The system built using MDD is component-based: software is decomposed into well-defined components that are executed under the control of a component platform - a sort of 'operating system' for components that provides services for coordinating component interactions.
5. The component architecture is clearly reflected in and explicitly modeled by the models.

In the MDA approach, the key notion is the use of Platform-Independent Models (PIMs) to describe the system in high-level terms, then refine these models (possibly using model transformations) into Platform-Specific Models (PSMs) which are then directly used in the implementation (which itself could - wholly or partially - be generated from models). In the MIC approach, the use of Domain-Specific Modeling Languages (DSMLs) is advocated (that allow increases in productivity via the use of domain-specific abstractions), as well as the application of model transformations for integrating analysis and other tools into an MDD process. In either case, the central notion is that of the model, which is tightly coupled to the actual implementation, and the implementation (code) cannot exists without it.

3 Basic Principles of Software Health Management

Health management is performed on the running system with the goal to diagnose and isolate faults close to their source so that a fault in a sub-system does not lead to a general failure of the global system. It
involves four different phases:

1. *Detection*: Anomalous behavior is detected by observing various measurements. Typically, an anomaly constitutes violation of certain conditions which should be satisfied by the system or the sub-system.

2. *Isolation*: Having detected one or more anomalies, the goal is to isolate the potential source(s) of fault(s);

3. *Mitigation*: Given the current system state and the isolated fault source(s), mitigation implies taking actions to reduce or eliminate the fault effects;

4. *Prognostics*: Looking forward in time, prognostics is done to predict future observable anomalies, faults, and failures.

To apply these techniques to software we must start by identifying the basic ‘Fault Containment Units’. Arguably, one ‘line of code’ is not a very good abstraction for this purpose. Instead, we assume that software systems are built from ‘software components’, where each component is a fault containment unit. Components encapsulate (and generalize) objects that provide functionality and we expect that these components are well-defined, independently developed, verified, and tested. Furthermore, all communication and synchronization among components is facilitated by a component framework that provides services for all component interactions, and no component interactions happen through out-of-band channels. This component framework acts as a middleware, provides composition services, and facilitates all messaging and synchronization among components, as well as supports fault management.

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Figure 1: Hierarchical Layout of Component-Level and System-Level Health Managers

There are various levels at which health management techniques can be applied: ranging from level of individual components, level of subsystems, to the whole system. As shown in figure 1, we have focused on
two levels of software health management: Component level- limited to the component level and the System level: includes system level information for doing diagnosis to identify root failure mode.

Component-level health management (CLHM) for software components detects anomalies, identifies and isolates the fault causes of those anomalies (if feasible), prognosticate future faults, and mitigates effects of faults – on the level of individual components. We envision CLHM implemented as a ‘side-by-side’ object that is attached to a specific component and acts as its health manager. It provides a localized and limited functionality for managing the health of one component, but it also reports to higher-level health manager(s) (the system health manager). The challenge in defining this local health management is to ensure that the local diagnosis and mitigation are globally consistent.

System Health Manager (SHM) manages the overall health of the System (Component Assembly). The CLHM processes hosted inside each of the components report their input (alarms monitored events) and output (mitigation action) to the System Health Manager. It is important to know the local mitigation action because it could affect the fault cascade through the system. Thereafter, the SHM is responsible for identification of root failure source(s)\(^1\). Once the fault source is identified (diagnosed), an appropriate mitigation strategy could be employed. This as mentioned earlier is the topic of ongoing investigations.

Implementing health management requires various monitoring functions that observe what is happening on the component’s interfaces, including monitoring preconditions, postconditions, deadline violations; generating diagnosis results and, if possible, prognosis for the health of the component, and taking mitigating actions. We argue that such functions can be implemented by code that is generated automatically from some higher-level model of the CLHM. The next section provides some details about our approach. In a previous paper [10], we presented the design of a software component framework that can serve as a foundation for SHM in real-time systems. Subsequently, we have enhanced the design of the component framework to provide various monitoring capabilities. Section 3.1 provides a brief background on this component framework. It assumes that the underlying operating system is ARINC-653 [1] compliant, state of the art operating system used in Integrated Modular Avionics. Appendix A provides a brief overview of ARINC-653.

### 3.1 The ARINC Component Model and Framework

In course of our research, we recognized that in-spite of the apparent benefits of a component-based approach to development for safety-critical systems, little work has been done on applying these concepts to hard real-time systems [10]. Specifically, there appears to be a need for a component model and a corresponding software framework that introduces the principles and techniques of component-based development to ARINC-653 systems [1] with a focus on precisely defined component interaction semantics, enabling timing constraints and allowing component interactions to be monitored effectively. Next few paragraphs provide a brief summary of the developed component model.

The ARINC Component Model (ACM) [10],[11] is built upon the capabilities of ARINC-653 [1] (see appendix). ACM follows the MIC approach (see section 2) and borrows concepts from other software component models, notably from the CORBA Component Model (CCM) [21] with a focus on precisely defined component interaction semantics, enabling timing constraints and allowing component interactions to be monitored effectively.

Figure 2 illustrates the main features of ARINC Component Model. A component can have four different kinds of ports - consumer port, publisher port, provided interface port (similar to a facet in CCM) and required interface port (similar to a CCM receptacle). A publisher port is a source of events: this port is used to produce events that will be consumed by another component/s. A publisher port needs to be triggered to publish an event (probably read from some internal state variable or a hardware source). This triggering can be either periodic or aperiodic (sporadic). While, a periodic publisher is triggered at regular intervals by a clock to supply data, an aperiodic publisher is invoked (sporadically) by an internal method, possibly the implementation code of another port. A consumer port as the name suggests acts as a sink for events. Like a publisher port, it can be triggered periodically (by a clock) or aperiodically (by the arrival of an event) to consume an event. While an aperiodic consumer consumes all the events published by its publisher on a FIFO basis (destructive read), a periodic consumer samples the events published at a specified rate (nondestructive read)

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\(^1\)We allow multiple failure mode hypotheses.
Figure 2: Component Model
A provided interface port or facet contains the implementation for the methods defined in the provided interface and services the request issued on these interfaces by a receptacle. The incoming client requests are queued by the middleware and are serviced by the provided port’s implementation in the FIFO order.

Two new concepts exist in our extension to the CCM: state variables, which are similar to attributes in CCM but cannot be modified from outside component, and component triggers, which are internal periodically activated methods within a component that can be used for internal bookkeeping and checking state invariants.

All the ports - publisher, consumer, facet, and receptacle - and the Component Trigger method have to finish their unit of work within a specified deadline. This deadline can be qualified as HARD (strict) or SOFT (relatively lenient). A HARD deadline violation is an error that requires intervention from the underlying middleware. A SOFT deadline violation results in a warning.

Like the deadline, all implementations can specify another property that must be respected - contracts. These contracts are expressed as pre-conditions and/or post-conditions. Any contract violation results in an error. This concept is based upon the logic system identified by Hoare [15]. The key feature of this logic are assertions of form \( \{ \text{pre} \} P \{ \text{post} \} \) commonly known as Hoare Triple, where \( P \) is a computer program.

3.2 Component Interactions

While each component and its associated ports, states, internal triggers can be individually configured, an assembly is not complete until the interactions between the component ports is configured. The association between the ports depends on their type (synchronous/asynchronous) and the event/interface type associated with the port. Two kinds of interactions, asynchronous interactions and synchronous interactions are possible between components. The possible combination of these interactions with periodic and aperiodic triggering of processes that are bound to the respective ports gives rise to a richer set of behaviors compared to CCM.

- **Asynchronous Interactions**: These interactions occur when a publish port of a component is connected to a consumer port of another component. While a consumer can be connected to only one publisher, a publisher may be connected to one or more consumers. Strict type matching on the event type is required between the publisher and its consumers.

  A periodic consumer always exhibits sampling behavior. Even if the rate of the publisher is indeterminate, for example if the publisher is aperiodic, setting the period of the consumer ensures that the events from the publisher are sampled at a specific rate. When the interacting publisher and consumer both are periodic, the value of the consumer’s period relative to the publisher’s determines if the consumer is over-sampling (higher rate of consumption or lower period compared to publisher) or under-sampling (lower rate of consumption or higher periodicity compared to publisher).

  Interaction between a periodic publisher and an aperiodic consumer is indicative of a pattern where the sink or the consumer is reactive in nature. In such a case, the consumer port stores incoming published events in a queue, which are consumed in a FIFO manner. If the queue size is configured appropriately, this allows the consumer to operate on all of the events received.

  The case for interaction between an aperiodic publisher and an aperiodic consumer is similar to the one between a periodic publisher and an aperiodic consumer.

- **Synchronous Interactions**: This interaction implies call-return semantics. A required interface port can be associated with a provided interface port of an identical interface type. A provides port can be associated with one or more requires ports. Because of the synchronous nature of these interactions, the deadline of required interface method (i.e. the caller) must be greater than the deadline value for the provided interface method (i.e. the callee).

  Synchronous ports in this model are always aperiodic. The interaction patterns observed in synchronous ports is borrowed from CCM. The key difference is deadline monitoring. The default type of interaction is call-return or two-way communication i.e. the Requires port waits for the provides port to finish its operation and return the results.

  Recently, we relaxed the restrictions on synchronous interactions to allow CORBA style one-way calls. When such methods are invoked, the Requires port performs a non-blocking call. It returns without
waiting for the Provides port to finish its operation. There are no return values in such calls. However, one should note that even though the call is made in a non-blocking fashion it is different from an asynchronous interaction. While, a publisher does not fail if a consumer fails to consume the message properly, a one-way call via the middleware will result in an exception if the target provided port is not available.

Appendix C describes these interactions, their sequence and timing in detail.

3.3 Modeling and Design Environment

The framework implementing ACM, called ARINC Component Framework (ACF), comes with a modeling language that allows the component developers to model a component and the set of services that it provides independent of actual deployment configuration (see figure 3). This allows us to conduct preliminary

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Figure 3: The system architecture, component configuration, component monitoring specifications, assemblies are specified in a domain specific modeling language.
constraint based analysis on the system. The model captures the component’s real-time properties and resource requirements using a domain specific modeling language. System integrators then configure software assemblies specifying the architecture of the system built from interacting components.

While specifying component models in the modeling environment, developers can also specify local monitors and local health management actions for each component (described in sections 4 and 5). Once the assembly has been specified, system integrators are required to specify the models for system-level health management (described later in section 6). During the deployment and integration process, system integrators associate each component with an ARINC-653 partition. Thereafter, code generation tools help the integrators to generate non-functional glue code and find suitable partition schedule and deploy the assembly. The developers write the functional code for each component using only the exposed interfaces provided by the framework. They are expected not to invoke the underlying low-level platform (APEX) services directly. Such restrictions enable us to use the well-defined semantics of specified interaction types between the components and analyze the system failure propagation at design time before deployment. This in turn allows us to generate the necessary diagnosis procedures required. This is explained later in section 6.1. Thus during the deployment and integration process, code generators can also generate the required health management framework. The generated code can be later compiled and executed on the runtime system.

3.4 Example

Figure 3.4 shows an assembly of three components deployed on two ARINC partitions. Connections between two ports have been annotated with the (periodicity, deadline) in milliseconds of the downstream port. Partition 1 contains the Sensor Component. The sensor component publishes an event every 4 milliseconds. Partition 2 contains the GPS and Navigation Display component. The GPS component consumes the event published by sensor at a periodic rate of 4 milliseconds. Afterwards it publishes an event, which is sporadically consumed by the Navigation Display (abbreviated as display). Thereafter, the display component updates its location by using getGPSData provided interface of the GPS Component.

This figure also describes the periodic schedule followed by the partitions, overseen by a controller process called Module Manager [10]. In this example, Partition 1’s phase was 0 milliseconds, while its duration was 1 millisecond. Partition 2’s phase was set to 1.0012 milliseconds. Its duration was also 0.08 millisecond. The logical publish-consume connection between sensor and GPS components is implemented via a sampling port (Sampling ports are basic inter-partition communication mechanism in ARINC 653 platforms). A Channel connects the source sampling port from partition 1 to destination sampling port in partition 2.
4 Anomaly Detection (Monitoring Specifications)

The health of the software system/assembly and its individual components can be tracked by deploying multiple monitors throughout the system. Each monitor checks for violations of a property or constraint that is local to a port or a component. The status of these monitors is reported to Health Managers at one or more levels (Component or System) to take the appropriate mitigation action. The modeling language allows system integrators to define these monitors and declare whether they should be reported at the local or the system level. Figure 5 summarizes different places (or ports) where a component’s behavior can be monitored to detect discrepancies. Based on these monitors, following discrepancies can be currently identified:

- **Lock Time Out**: The framework implicitly generates monitors to check for resource starvation. The value for time out is either set to a default value equal to the deadline of the process associated with
component port or can be specified by the system designer.

- **Data Validity violation** (only applicable to consumers): Any data token consumed by a consumer port has an associated expiry age. This is also known as the validity period in ARINC-653 sampling ports. We have extended this to be applicable to all types of component consumer ports, both periodic and aperiodic.

- **Pre-condition Violation**: Developers can specify conditions that should be checked before executing. These conditions can be expressed over the current value or the historical change in the value, or rate of change of values of variables (with respect to previously known value for same parameter) such as
  1. the event-data of asynchronous calls,
  2. function-parameters of synchronous calls, and
  3. (monitored) state variables of the component.

- **User-code Failure**: Any error or exception in the user code can be abstracted by the software developer as an error condition which they can choose to report to the framework. Any unreported error is recognized as a potential unobservable discrepancy.

- **Post-condition Violation**: Similar to preconditions. But these conditions are checked after the execution of function associated with the component port.

- **Deadline Violation**: Any execution once started must finish within the specified deadline.

These Monitors can be specified via (1) attributes of model elements (e.g. deadline, Data Validity, lock time out), (2) via a simple expression language (e.g. conditions). The expressions can be formed over the (current) values of variables (parameters of the call, or state variables of the component), their change since the last invocation, their rate of change (change divided by a time value). Table 1 presents a summary.

**Example: Execution Sequence of Generated Monitors** Figure 6 shows the flowchart of the code generated to handle incoming messages on a consumer port. The shaded gray decision boxes are associated with the generated monitors. The failed monitored discrepancy is always reported to the local component health manager. Deadline violation is always monitored in parallel by the runtime framework. The white boxes are the possible actions taken by the local health manager, and they are discussed in the next section.

## 5 Component-Level Health Management

The monitors observe the conditions specified in the component model. Upon violation, they report the occurrence of the event to the component-level health manager. A Component Level Health Manager (CLHM), as the name suggests, observes the health of a component. The operation of a CLHM can be
specified as a state machine in the modeling environment. It can be configured to react with a mitigation action from a pre-defined set in response to violations observed by local component monitors. Formally, a health manager can be described as a timed state machine $HM = \langle S, S_i, M, Z_{\tau+}, T, A \rangle$, where

- $S$ is the set of all possible states for the health manager.
- $S_i \in S$ is the singleton initial state.
- $M$ is the set of all monitored events that are reported to the health manager by a component process or the framework.
- $Z_{\tau+}$ is the set of all events generated due to passage of time.
- $A$ is the set of all possible mitigation actions issued by the health manager. Currently, supported mitigation actions are specified in Table 2.
- $T : S \times (M \cup Z_{\tau+}) \rightarrow A \times S$ is the set of all possible transitions that can change the state of the manager due to passage of time or arrival of an input event. To ensure a non-blocking state machine, the framework assumes a default self-transition with IGNORE action if the health manager receives an event which it cannot process in the current state.

Figure 7 describes a component level health manager. The process associated with the health manager is sporadically triggered by events generated either by the framework (for resource and deadline violation) or by the port monitors associated with the process. The CLHM’s internal state machine tracks the component’s state and issues mitigation actions. Processes that trigger the health manager, can block using a blackboard to receive the health manager action; they are finally released when the health manager publishes a response (mitigation action) on their respective blackboard.

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2Blackboards are primitive inter-process communication structures implemented by ARINC-653 platforms.
6 System-Level Health Management

In our implementation, System Health Manager (SHM) is a collection of three different components, shown in figure 8. These components can either be deployed in a separately reserved system module, or they can be deployed in a module shared by other components in the system assembly. The aggregator component is responsible for receiving all the alarm inputs, including the local component health manager decisions and passing them to the diagnosis engine. The aperiodic consumer inside the diagnosis engine runs in an aperiodic ARINC-653 process, which is triggered by the alarms sent by the aggregator. The third component is the response engine - this component is still under development.

The diagnosis engine uses a timed fault propagation (TFPG) model. A TFPG is a labeled directed graph where nodes represent either failure modes, which are fault causes, or discrepancies, which are off-nominal conditions that are the effects of failure modes. Edges between nodes in the graph capture the effect of failure propagation over time in the underlying dynamic system. To represent failure propagation in multi-mode (switching) systems, edges in the graph model can be activated or deactivated depending on a set of possible operation modes of the system. Appendix B provides a brief overview of TFPG.

The diagnosis engine uses the TFPG model of the software assembly under management to reason about the input alarms and the local responses received from different component level health manager. It then hypothesizes the possible faults that could have generated those alarms. As more information becomes available, the SHM (using the diagnosis engine) improves its fault-hypothesis as needed, which can then potentially be used to drive the mitigation strategy at the system level. Currently, available System level mitigation actions are listed in Table 2. However, this list is not final as system-level mitigation approaches are subject of ongoing investigations.
6.1 Creating the System Level Fault-Propagation Model for System-Level Diagnosis

As described in previous sections, in this framework the software assemblies are composed of Components which are in turn composed of specific kinds of ports - Publisher, Consumer, Provides Interface, and Requires Interface.

The Fault Propagation model for the entire system involves capturing the fault propagation within each component as well as capturing the fault propagation across component boundaries. While the latter can be automatically derived from the interactions captured by the software assembly (via component ports) the former can be derived from the interactions captured by the data/control flow inside each component.

This automatic derivation of fault propagation from component and assembly models is possible because the end-points of these interactions - the component ports - exhibit a well defined behavior/interaction pattern (see appendix C). This pattern is dependent on the specific port-type - Publisher, Consumer, Provides Interface, Requires Interface - and is somewhat independent of the additional properties - data/event types, interfaces/methods, periodicity, deadline - that customize a port. Hence, if a template fault propagation model can be constructed for each of the different port-types, then using the interactions captured in the control/data flow model of the component and the assembly model of the system, the fault propagation graph for the entire system can be generated.

In principle, this approach is similar to the failure propagation and transformation calculus described by Wallace [23], which showed how architectural wiring of components and failure behavior of individual components can be used to compute failure properties for the entire system.

The template fault propagation model for each kind of interaction port deals with:

- Failures Modes that represent the failures originating from within the interaction port
- Monitored Discrepancies whose presence is detected through the Health Monitor Alarms
- The Unmonitored / silent Discrepancies whose presence is not detected through alarms
- The Input Discrepancy ports that represent entry points of failure effects from outside the interaction port
- The Output Discrepancy ports that represent exit points of failure effects to outside the interaction port
- The failure propagation links between the entities described above
- The Mode Variables that enable/disable a failure propagation edge based on their value which is set by the Component Health Manager’s Response

The Failure Modes / Discrepancies are directly related to the list of monitors described in section 4. These include failure modes / discrepancies related to one or more of the following violations/failures/problems - LOCK Problem, Validity violation, Pre-condition failure, User code failure, Post-Condition failure, Deadline violation. The Mode Variables are related to the Component Health Manager’s response to the errors detected by monitors - LOCK Problem Response, Validity Violation Response etc. The Input/Output Discrepancy ports list includes various manifestations of the problems listed above - No/ Late/ Invalid Data Published, No/ Late/ Invalid Return Data, Bad Input/Output Data, No Invoke, No Update etc.

6.2 An Example: Generic TFPG for a Periodic Consumer

Figure 9 shows the failure propagation template created for a periodic consumer. The exact number and type of the Failure Modes, Monitored/Unmonitored discrepancies, Input/Output ports and the failure propagation links between them is determined by specific type of the interaction port - Publisher / Consumer / Provides Interface / Requires Interface. It should also be noted that sometimes it might not be possible to monitor some of the failures / alarms mentioned above. In such cases, these observed discrepancies are turned
Figure 9: TFPG model for periodic consumer interaction port. Root Nodes in each pattern are representative of either source of fault (Failure Mode) or cascading effect of another failure within the interaction port (Reference to a preceding discrepancy) or outside of the interaction port (Discrepancy Port).
into unobserved discrepancies and the fault effect propagates through the discrepancy without raising any observation (alarm). The resulting template failure propagation model captures: (1) The effect of failures originating from other interaction-ports, (2) The cascading effects of failures within the interaction port, and (3) The effect of failures propagating to other interaction-ports.

The list below explains the failure effects that are captured in a generic TFPG model through the example of the consumer TFPG model. The Consumer-TFPG model, is presented in terms of the failure propagations captured in the context of the observed alarms - LOCK_TIMEOUT, VALIDITY_FAILURE, PRE-CONDITION Violation, USER-CODE Failure, Deadline Violation. Each of these sub-graphs cover most of the points enumerated above.

1. LOCK_TIMEOUT - This is caused by problems in obtaining the Component Lock. Being a real-time system, any attempt to obtain a lock is bounded by a maximum deadline. In case of time out the fault is observed as a discrepancy with an anomaly of LOCK_TIMEOUT, resulting in a CHM response of either IGNORE or REFUSE/ABORT. Based on the response, its failure effect can lead to an invalid or a missing state update and affect entities downstream.

2. VALIDITY_FAILURE - This is caused when the “age” of the data fed to the consumer is not valid. It is observed as a discrepancy with an anomaly of VALIDITY_FAILURE, resulting in a CHM response of either USE_PAST_DATA or REFUSE/ABORT. Based on the response, its failure effect can lead to an invalid or a missing state update and effect entities downstream. The failure effect could also cascade into one or more of the anomalies described below.

3. PRE-CONDITION_FAILURE - This is caused when the pre-condition to the consumer process is not satisfied. This anomaly could also be observed as a result of a VALIDITY_FAILURE followed by a response to USE_PAST_DATA. It is observed as a discrepancy with an anomaly of PRE-CONDITION_FAILURE, resulting in a CHM response of either IGNORE or REFUSE/ABORT. Based on the response, its failure effect can lead to an invalid or a missing state update and affect entities downstream. The failure effect could also cascade into user-code and/or deadline violation.

4. USER-CODE_FAILURE - This is caused when there is a failure in the user-code (e.g. exception ). This anomaly could be observed as a result of a USER-CODE failure (captured as a failure mode) or a cascading failure effect propagation from VALIDITY_FAILURE and subsequent health management response of USE_PAST_DATA or PRE-CONDITION violation followed by an IGNORE response. Once observed, depending on the local CHM response its failure effect can lead to an invalid or a missing state update and affect entities downstream. The failure effect could also cascade into a deadline violation.

5. DEADLINE_FAILURE - This is caused when the process deadline is violated. This anomaly could be observed as a result of a Deadline failure (captured as a failure mode) or a cascading failure effect propagation from VALIDITY_FAILURE followed with a local health management response of USE_PAST_DATA or PRE-CONDITION violation with a local CHM response of IGNORE or USER_CODE. It is observed as a discrepancy with an anomaly of DEADLINE_FAILURE, resulting in a CHM response of either STOP (stopping the process in case of hard-deadline violation) or IGNORE (in case of soft-deadline violation) or RESTART. Based on the response, its failure effect can lead to an invalid / missing / late state update and affect entities downstream.

It should be noted that while the interaction pattern between a publisher port and a consumer port produces a fault propagation in the direction of data/event flow i.e. from the publisher to the consumer, the interaction pattern between a Requires interface and its corresponding Provider interface involves fault propagation in both directions. The fault propagation within a component is captured through the propagations across the bad updates on the state variables within the component, observed as pre-condition or post-condition monitors on the interfaces/interactions ports that update or read from those state variables.

Appendix D lists the textual specification of timed fault propagation templates for all component ports. These templates are used to construct the TFPG model for the assembly.
7 Case Study

In this case study we consider the example of the GPS assembly discussed in section 3.4. First, we describe the nominal execution of the system. Then, we discuss component level health management and system-level diagnosis using two fault scenarios. This case study does not cover system level mitigation.

**Baseline: No Fault.** Figure 10 shows the timed sequence of events as they happen during the first frame of operation. These sequence charts were plotted using the plotter package from OMNeT++,\(^5\). 0th event marks the start of the module manager, which then creates the Linux processes for the two partitions. Each partition then creates its respective (APEX) processes and signals the module manager. This all happens before the frames are scheduled. After the occurrence of 0th event, module manager signals partition 1 to start. Upon start, partition 1 starts the ORB process that handles all CORBA-related functions. It then starts the sensor health manager. Note that all processes are started in an order based on priority. Finally, it starts the periodic sensor process at event number 8. The sensor process publishes an event at event number 9 and finishes its execution at event number 10. After 1 millisecond since its start, partition 1 is stopped by the module manager at event number 14. Immediately afterwards, partition 2 is started. Partition 2 starts all its ORB process and health managers at the beginning of its period. At event 26, partition 2 starts the periodic GPS consumer process. It consumes the sensor event at event 27. At event 27, GPS publisher process produces an event and finishes its execution cycle at 28. The production of GPS event causes the sporadic release of aperiodic consumer process in Navigation Display (event 33). The navigation process uses remote procedure call to invoke the GPS get data ARINC process. The GPS data value is returned to navigation process at event 49. It finishes the execution at event 51. Partition 2 is stopped after 1 millisecond from its start. This marks the end of one frame. Note that these events do not capture the internal functional logic of the GPS algorithm. Moreover, the claim of No-fault in this sequence of events is made because of the absence of any violation of component health monitors.

**Fault Scenario:** For the next two subsections we consider a scenario in which Sensor (figure 3.4) stops publishing data. First we describe the local component level health management action, which includes local detection as well as mitigation. Then we will see an example of system level diagnosis. System level mitigation has not been included in this example. It is still the subject of ongoing research.

7.1 Component Level Health Management Example

**Validity Violation at GPS Consumer Port.** Sensor publishes an event every 4 milliseconds in the nominal condition. In this experiment, we injected a fault in the code such the sensor misses all event publications after its first execution. Figure 11 shows the experiment events that elapsed after the sensor fault injection. As can be seen in the figure, there is no activity in Partition1 because of the sensor-fault (event number 57 to 59). The GPS process is started by partition 2 at event 65. At this time, the validity

---

\(^5\)http://www.omnetpp.org/
precondition specified in the method that handles the incoming event fails. This precondition checks the Boolean value of a validity flag that is set by the framework every time the sampling port is read. This validity flag is set to false if the age of the event stored in the sampling port is older than the refresh period specified for the sampling port (4 milliseconds in this case). Upon detection, the GPS process raises an error, which causes the release of GPS health manager. In this case, the GPS health manager (see figure 12) publishes a USE\_PAST\_DATA response back. The USE\_PAST\_DATA response means that the process can continue and use the previously cached value.

**Bad GPS Data at NavDisplay Port** The fault introduced due to the missing sensor event and the GPS’s response of use past data results in a fault in the Navigation-Display component. The GPS’s getGPSData process sends out bad data when queried by the navigation display. The bad data is defined by the rate of change of GPS data being less than a threshold. This fault simulates an error in the filtering algorithm in the GPS such that it loses track of the actual position because the sensor data did not get updated. Event numbers 73 to 88 in Figure 11 capture the snapshot corresponding to this experiment. The navigation display component retrieves the current GPS data at event 75 using the remote procedure call. At event 81, the post condition check of the remote procedure call is violated. This violation is defined by a threshold on the RATE of change of current GPS data compared to past data (last sample). The navigation display component raises an error at event 82 to its CLHM. At event 86, it receives a REFUSE response from the health manager (see figure 12(a)). The REFUSE response means that the process that detected the fault should immediately abort further processing and return cleanly. The effect of this action is that the navigation’s GPS coordinates are not updated as the remote procedure call did not finish without error.

Next subsection discusses the system level health management actions related to this fault cascade scenario.

### 7.2 System Level Health Management Example

Figure 13 shows the high-level TFPG model for the system/assembly described in figure 3.4. The detailed TFPG-model specific to each interaction pattern is contained inside the respective TFPG component model (brown box). The figure shows failure propagation between the Sensor publisher (Sensor\_data\_out) and GPS consumer(GPS\_data\_in), the GPS publisher (GPS\_data\_out) and NavDisplay consumer (NavDisplay\_data\_in), the requires method in NavDisplay(NavDisplay\_gps\_data\_src\_getGPSData) and the provides method in GPS (GPS\_gps\_data\_src\_getGPSData), the effect of the bad updates on state variables and the entities updating or reading the state-variables.

**System Level Diagnosis Process:** Figure 14 shows the assembly in figure 3.4 augmented with Component and System level Health Managers and the interaction between them. The TFPG-Diagnosis engine...
Figure 12: (a) CLHM for NavDisplay. It can be triggered by either event $e_1$ or event $e_2$. The programmed mitigation response is to refuse or abort the call (b) CLHM for GPS. It can be triggered by either event $e_1$ or event $e_2$.

hosted inside the SHM component is instantiated with generated TFPG-model of the system/assembly. When it receives the first alarm from a fault scenario, it reasons about it by generating all hypotheses that could have possibly triggered the alarm. Each hypothesis lists its possible failure modes and their possible timing interval, the triggered alarms that are supportive of the hypothesis, the triggered alarms that are inconsistent with the hypothesis, the missing alarms that should have triggered and the alarms that are expected to trigger in future. Additionally, the reasoner computes hypothesis metrics such as Plausibility and Robustness that provide a means of comparison. The higher the metrics the more reasonable it is to expect the hypothesis to be the real cause of the problem. As more alarms are produced, the hypothesis are further refined. If the new alarms are supportive of existing hypotheses, they are updated to reflect the refinement in their metrics and alarm list. If the new alarms are not supportive of any of the existing hypotheses with the highest plausibility, then the reasoner refines these hypotheses such that hypotheses can explain these alarms.

Figure 15 shows the TFPG-results for fault scenario under study. The initial alarm is generated because of data-validity violations in the consumer of the GPS component. When this alarm was reported to the local Component Health manager, it issued a response directing the GPS component to use past data (USE_PAST_DATA). While the issue was resolved local to the GPS component, the combined effect of the failure and mitigation action propagated to the Navigation Display component. In the Navigation Display component, a monitor observing the post-condition violation on a Required interface was triggered because the GPS-data validated its constraints. These two alarms were sent to the System Health Manager and processed by the TFPG-Diagnoser.

As can be seen from the results, the system correctly generated two hypotheses (figure 15, lines 20 and 24). The first hypothesis blamed the sensor component lock to be the root problem. The second hypothesis blamed the user level code in the sensor publisher process to be the root failure mode. In this situation the second hypothesis was the true cause. However, because in this example lock time out monitors were not specified the diagnoser was not able to reasonably disambiguate between the two possibilities.

8 Related Work

One notable approach to system health management for physical systems is to design a controller that inherently drives the system back in safe region upon failure of a system. This is the basis of goal-based control paradigm [24] that supports a deductive controller that is responsible for observing the plant’s state (mode estimation) and issuing commands to move the plant through a sequence of states that achieves the
Figure 13: TFPG model for the assembly
Figure 14: This figure shows augmentation of an assembly with an alarm aggregator component and the diagnosis engine. Compare this to the assembly shown in figure 3.4.

specified goal. This approach inherently provides for fault recovery by using the control program to set an appropriate configuration goal that negates the problems caused by faults in the physical system. However, these control algorithms are themselves typically implemented in software and are therefore reliant on the fault-free behavior of related software components.

Formal argument for checking correctness of execution of a computer program based on a first order logic system was first presented by Hoare in [15]. Later this concept was extended to distributed systems by Meyer in [18, 16]. A contract implemented by Meyer specified the requires and ensure clauses as assertions specified by a list of boolean expressions. These assertions were specified as logic operations upon the value domain of the program variables and were compiled out in the running system. In ACM, these correctness conditions are specified by preconditions and post conditions, which can be defined over both the value-domain and temporal-domain of program variables as well as the state variables belonging to the component. We envision that these checks are performed in real-time on the system. This is especially necessary because there is a high likelihood for software defects being present in complex systems that arise only under exceptional circumstances. These circumstances may include faults in the hardware system (including both the computing and non-computing hardware) - software is very often not prepared for hardware faults [12].

Conmy et al. presented a framework for certifying Integrated Modular Avionics applications build on ARINC-653 platforms in [8]. Their main approach was the use of ‘safety contracts’ to validate the system at design time. They defined the relationship between two or more components within a safety critical system. However, they did not present any details on the nature of these contracts and how they can be specified. We believe that a similar approach can be taken to formulate acceptance criteria, in terms of “correct” value-domain and temporal-domain properties that will let us detect any deviation in a component’s behavior.

Nicholson presented the concept of reconfiguration in integrated modular systems running on operating systems that provide robust spatial and temporal partitioning in [19]. He identified that health monitoring is critical for a safety-critical software system and that in the future it will be necessary to trade-off redundancy based fault tolerance for the ability of “reconfiguration on failure” while still operational. He described that a possibility for achieving this goal is to use a set of lookup tables, similar to the health monitoring tables used in ARINC-653 system specification, that maps trigger event to a set of system blue-prints providing the mapping functions. Furthermore, he identified that this kind of reconfiguration is more amenable to failures that happen gradually, indicated by parameter deviations.

Goldberg and Horvath have discussed discrepancy monitoring in the context of ARINC-653 health-management architecture in [13]. They describe extensions to the application executive component, software instrumentation and a temporal logic run-time framework. Their method primarily depends on modeling the expected timed behavior of a process, a partition, or a core module - the different levels of fault-protection layers. All behavior models contain “faulty states” which represent the violation of an expected property. They associate mitigation functions using callbacks with each fault.

Sammapun et al. describe a run-time verification approach for properties written in a timed variant of LTL called MEDL in [22]. They described an architecture called RT-MaC for checking the properties of a target program during run-time. All properties are evaluated based on a sequence of observations made on a “target program”. To make these observations all target programs are modified to include a “filter”
that generates the interesting event and reports values to the event recognizer. The event recognizer is a module that forwards the events to a checker that can check the property. Timing properties are checked by using watchdog timers on the machines executing the target program. Main difference in this approach and the approach of Goldberg and Horvath outlined in previous paragraph is that RT-MaC supports an “until” operator that allows specification of a time bound where a given property must hold. Both of these efforts provided valuable input to our design of run-time component level health management.

9 Summary

This paper presented our first steps towards building a Software Health Management technology that extends beyond classical software fault tolerance techniques. In the approach, we focused on building a framework first that combines component-oriented software construction (CCM) with a real-time operating system with partitioning capability (ARINC 653). Based on this framework, we defined an approach for ‘Component-level Software Health Management’ and created a model-based toolsuite (modeling tool, generators, and software platform) that supports the model-driven engineering of component-based systems with health management services. Our current work is focusing on extending these concepts to the system level, where faults occur in and propagate across many components, where a more complex diagnosis is needed, and where more sophisticated mitigation logic is necessary. We also plan to extend this work to the entire, larger system: a physical system, like an aerospace vehicle, that may have its own, non-software failure modes. The challenge in that level is to integrate health management across the entire hardware / software ensemble.
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References


A Background on ARINC-653

The ARINC-653 software specification describes the standard Application Executive (APEX) kernel and associated services that should be supported by safety-critical real-time operating system (RTOS) used in avionics. It has also been proposed as the standard operating system interface on space missions [9]. The APEX kernel in such systems is required to provide robust spatial and temporal partitioning. The purpose of such partitioning is to provide functional separation between applications for fault-containment. A partition in this environment is similar to an application process in regular operating systems, however, it is completely isolated, both spatially and temporally, from other partitions in the system and it also acts as a fault-containment unit. It also provides a reactive health monitoring service that supports recovery actions by using call-back functions, which are mapped to specific error conditions in configuration tables at the partition/module/system level.

Spatial partitioning [13] ensures exclusive use of a memory region for a partition by an ARINC process (unless otherwise mentioned, a 'process' is meant to be understood as an ‘ARINC Process’ in the rest of this paper). It is similar to a thread in regular operating systems. Each partition has predetermined areas of allocated memory and its processes are prohibited from accessing memory outside of the partition’s defined memory area. The protection for memory is enforced by the use of memory management hardware. This guarantees that a faulty process in a partition cannot ruin the data structures of other processes in different partitions. For instance, space partitioning can be used to separate the low-criticality vehicle management components from safety-critical flight control components. Faults in the vehicle management components must not destroy or interfere with the flight control components, and this property could be ensured via the partitioning mechanism.

Temporal partitioning [13] refers to the strict time-slicing of partitions, guaranteeing access for the partitions to the processing resource(s) according to a fixed, periodic schedule. The operating system core (supported by hardware timer devices) is responsible for enforcing the partitioning and managing the individual partitions. The partitions are scheduled on a fixed-time basis, and the order and timing of partitions are defined at configuration time. This provides deterministic scheduling whereby the partitions are allowed to access the processor or other hardware resources for only a predetermined period of time. Temporal partitioning guarantees that a partition has exclusive access to the resources during its assigned time period. It also guarantees that when the predetermined period of execution time of a partition is over, the execution of the partition will be interrupted and the partition itself will be put into a dormant state. Then, the next partition in the schedule order will be granted the right to execution. Note that all shared hardware resources must be managed by the partitioning operating system in order to ensure that control of the resource is relinquished when the time slice for the corresponding partition expires.

B Background on TFPG

Timed failure propagation graphs (TFPG) are causal models that capture the temporal characteristics of failure propagation in dynamic systems. A TFPG is a labeled directed graph. Nodes in graph represent either failure modes (fault causes), or discrepancies (off-nominal conditions that are the effects of failure modes). Edges between nodes capture the propagation of the failure effect. Formally, a TFPG is represented as a tuple \( (F, D, E, M, A) \), where:

- \( F \) is a nonempty set of failure nodes..
- \( D \) is a nonempty set of discrepancy nodes. Each discrepancy node is of AND or OR type. Further, if a discrepancy is observable, then it is associated with an alarm.
- \( E \subseteq V \times V \) is a set of edges connecting the set of all nodes \( V = F \cup D \). Each edge has a minimum and a maximum time interval within which the failure effect will propagate from the source to the destination node. Further, an edge can be active or inactive based on the state of its associated system modes.
- \( M \) is a nonempty set of system modes.

An OR(AND) type discrepancy node will be activated when the failure propagates to the node from any (all) of its parents.
A is a nonempty set of alarms.

The TFPG model serves as the basis for a robust online diagnosis scheme that reasons about the system failures based on the events (alarms and modes) observed in real-time [14, 7, 6]. The model is used to derive efficient reasoning algorithms that implement fault diagnostics: fault source identification by tracing observed discrepancies back to their originating failure modes. The TFPG approach has been applied and evaluated for various aerospace and industrial systems [20]. More recently, there is a distributed approach for reasoning with TFPG [17].

C Execution of Component Ports and Interaction Between Them

All component ports are statically bound to an ARINC-653 process. Periodic publishers or periodic consumers are bound to periodic processes, while aperiodic publishers and aperiodic consumers are bound to aperiodic processes. Each method of a provided or required port is mapped to a unique aperiodic ARINC-653 processes.

Figure 16 shows the timed automaton model for an aperiodic process. Start event is issued by any process in the same partition which wants to release the process. The exact transition from ready to running is unobservable. It happens when the Linux FIFO scheduler picks the process from the process queue and gives it some CPU time. Thereafter, any preemption or wait for resource causes the transition to the waiting
state. If the finished condition is true, the process is running and the deadline has not been violated, the process goes back to the dormant state. The partition scheduler is responsible for observing the clock for deadline violation and if necessary moving the process to stopped state. Note that this happens only if the deadline was marked as hard.

Figure 17 shows the timed automaton model for a periodic process. The first start event is issued by the partition upon initialization. The exact transition from ready to running is unobservable. Similar to the aperiodic process, it happens when the Linux FIFO scheduler picks the process from the process queue and gives it some CPU time. Thereafter, any preemption or wait for resource causes the transition to the waiting state. If the finished condition is true, the process is running and the deadline has not been violated, the process goes to the waiting on period state. This is different than the aperiodic process. Thereafter, the process goes back to the ready state after the expiry of period time. The partition scheduler is responsible for observing and evaluating the clock guards in this automaton.

C.1 Trigger Interaction Pattern

Before we start the discussion on semantics of ports and their interaction it is essential to describe a basic interaction pattern that occurs when one ARINC-653 process invokes another ARINC-653 process. It should be noted that only aperiodic processes can be invoked in this manner.

The invoking process is called the trigger process. This pattern will be seen when we discuss execution semantics of aperiodic consumers and provided ports. Trigger process starts the invoked process by using an API that generates the corresponding Start event. Then, the trigger process enters the waiting for resource state. Here resource is a semaphore which is reset when the invoked process finishes up. Any processes interacting in this manner must satisfy:

\[
\text{Deadline}^{\text{Trigger}} \geq \text{Deadline}^{\text{InvokedProcess}} \tag{1}
\]

C.2 Ports

Behavior of all ports, periodic or aperiodic is dictated by the sequence of activities that take place when they are in the running state. Figure 18 shows the running states of periodic publishers, aperiodic publishers, periodic consumers, and aperiodic consumers. It also describes the sequence of activities of message transmission.

Below, we explain these activities for each port and explain they interact. We assume the existence of a globally synchronized hyper period across all modules of the software assembly. We also assume the existence of a global clock \(T\) that is reset at the start of global hyper period and can be used to measure the elapse of time relative to the start of last global hyperiod.

C.3 Periodic Publisher (PP)

Execution of a periodic publisher starts when its ARINC-653 process transitions to the ready state (fig. 17), which happens every \(\text{Period}^{\text{PP}}\) time units. The first execution of the periodic process is delayed by a phase shift, \(\phi^{\text{PP}}\), which is the time when Start was called for the process. Thus, the time when the periodic publisher enters the ready state in the \(K^{th}\) run of the global hyper period can be written as:

\[
T^{\text{PP}}_{\text{Ready}}(N,K) = N * \text{Period}^{\text{PP}} + \phi \tag{2}
\]

\[
N \in \left[0, \frac{\text{Global Hyper Period}}{\text{Period}^{\text{PP}}}\right] \cap \mathbb{Z} \tag{3}
\]

Any valuation of the global clock relative to the start of \(K^{th}\) run of the global hyper period can be converted to absolute time since start of the system as:

\[
T(N,K) = T(N,K) + K * \text{Global Hyper Period} \tag{4}
\]

For brevity, unless we are specifically referring to time evaluations across two different runs of the global hyper periods, we will drop the functional parameter \(K\) in the notation.
Figure 18: Sequence of Activities Inside the Running State of publishers and consumers and transmission channels
Once the publisher enters the running state, it attempts to obtain the lock on the component. Then, it checks the preconditions, passes control to the user level code to prepare the data, dispatches the data, checks the postconditions, releases the lock and finishes execution. Any failure while obtaining lock, checking preconditions, preparing data (user code), and checking postconditions interrupts the nominal execution and reports the discrepancy to component health manager. Whether execution is continued or aborted depends upon the health manager output. Refer to the main document for more information on health manager. The timed transition trace for nominal execution for periodic publisher is:

\[
<\text{Ready}, T^{PP}_{\text{Ready}}(N)>, <\text{Lock}, T^{PP}_{\text{Lock}}(N)>, <\text{PreCond}, T^{PP}_{\text{Pre}}(N)>, <\text{Prepare}, T^{PP}_{\text{Prepare}}(N)>,
\]
\[
<\text{Dispatch}, T^{PP}_{\text{Dispatch}}(N)>, <\text{PostCond}, T^{PP}_{\text{Post}}(N)>, <\text{ReleaseLock}, T^{PP}_{\text{Release}}(N)>,
\]
\[
<\text{Finish}, T^{PP}_{\text{Finish}}(N)>
\]

\[T^{PP}_{\text{Finish}}(N) - T^{PP}_{\text{Ready}}(N) \leq \text{Deadline}^{PP}
\] (5)

### C.4 Aperiodic Publisher (AP)

An aperiodic publisher in invoked by some other component process, which generates the Start event causing the aperiodic process associated with the AP to transition to ready state. This is the start of execution as shown in figure 16. Upon invocation, the invoking process enters the Waiting For Resource state. It goes back to the running state when the invoked aperiodic publisher finishes execution. Given that the invoking process belongs to the same component and is still in Running state, unlike periodic publisher, aperiodic publisher does not need to obtain the component lock. Moreover, the data to be published is passed from the invoking process to AP and hence it does not need to spend anytime in the preparing data stage. Rest of its activities are similar to periodic publisher. The timed transition trace for nominal execution is given as:

\[
<\text{Ready}, T^{AP}_{\text{Ready}}(N)>, <\text{PreCond}, T^{AP}_{\text{Pre}}(N)>, <\text{Dispatch}, T^{AP}_{\text{Dispatch}}>, <\text{PostCond}, T^{AP}_{\text{Post}}(N)>,
\]
\[
<\text{Finish}, T^{AP}_{\text{Finish}}(N)>
\]

Here N is an index that counts the number of time the aperiodic publisher has been executed in the global hyper period.

\[T^{AP}_{\text{Finish}}(N) - T^{AP}_{\text{Ready}}(N) \leq \text{Deadline}^{AP}
\] (6)

### C.5 Message Transmission (MT)

Ports of components residing in different partitions are connected via channels. These channels can connect one source port to multiple destination ports and are responsible for transmitting the messages.

Figures 18 c and d show the sequence of activities that happens when a message is dispatched from one of the ports. The act of dispatching a message just puts it in a network queue. When the prescribed time comes, the transmission channel sends the message over the network. Upon reaching the recipient, the message is received and pushed into the application queue, if the receiving port has a queue. Otherwise, the new data overwrites the old data in a sampling port. The timed transition trace for message transmission is given as:

\[\text{Dispatch of data just adds it to network queue. The message transmission happens asynchronously. Look at Figures 18 c and d}
\]

\[\text{A timed transition trace is an execution of the timed automaton. It is written as a sequence of tuples. The first value in the tuple is the event which in this case represents the entry of a state. The second value is typically a vector which contains all clock values. For brevity, we only mention the value of global clock T.}
\]

\[\text{A channel transmitting messages across modules can be implemented as a virtual link in Avionics Full Duplex Switched Ethernet Network (AFDX)}
\]
\( K - J \leq 1 \) \hspace{1cm} (7)

i.e. there can at most one global hyper period between the dispatch of a message and when it is actually sent over the network by the channel. Values of \( T_{Send}^{MT} \) can be specified using a time-triggered schedule.

### C.6 Periodic Consumer (PC)

A periodic consumer samples the data it receives via the sampling channel periodically. Like a periodic publisher, the execution of periodic consumer starts when its ARINC process enters the ready state. The first execution of the periodic process is delayed by a phase shift, \( \phi_{PC} \), which is the time when \texttt{Start} was called for the process. The time when execution of periodic consumer starts in the \( K \)th run of the global hyper period can be written as:

\[
T_{Ready}^{PC}(N, K) = N \times \text{Period}^{PC} + \phi_{PC} \hspace{1cm} (8)
\]

\[
N \in \left[ 0, \frac{\text{Global Hyper Period}}{\text{Period}^{PC}} \right] \cap \mathbb{Z} \hspace{1cm} (9)
\]

Once PC enters the running state, checks the validity (freshness) of the sampled data. Then it attempts to obtain the lock on the component, checks the preconditions, passes control to user level code to process consumed data, checks postconditions, releases lock and finishes execution. Any failure in these stages is interrupts the nominal execution and reports the discrepancy to component health manager. The timed transition trace for the \( N \)th nominal execution for periodic consumer is:

\[
< \text{Ready}, T_{Ready}^{PC}(N) >, < \text{Sample}, T_{Sample}^{PC}(N) >, < \text{Validity}, T_{Validity}^{PC}(N) >, < \text{Lock}, T_{Lock}^{PC}(N) >, \nonumber \\
< \text{PreCond}, T_{Pre}^{PC}(N) >, < \text{Process}, T_{Process}^{PC}(N) >, < \text{PostCond}, T_{Post}^{PC}(N) >, \nonumber \\
< \text{ReleaseLock}, T_{Release}^{PC}(N) >, < \text{Finish}, T_{Finish}^{PC}(N) > \nonumber 
\]

\[
T_{Finish}^{PC}(N) - T_{Ready}^{PC}(N) \leq \text{Deadline}^{PC} \hspace{1cm} (10)
\]

### C.7 Aperiodic Consumer (AC)

Figure 18 (e) describes the various stages that happens when the aperiodic consumer is running. A separate process called aperiodic consumer trigger is responsible for releasing the aperiodic consumer upon receipt of an incoming data. Other difference between periodic consumer and aperiodic consumer is that while the sample data activity of periodic consumer is a non-destructive read i.e. the same data item can be read again, the accept data activity is a destructive read. Apart from that all other activities of aperiodic consumer are similar to periodic consumer. The timed transition trace for the \( N \)th nominal execution for aperiodic consumer is:

\[
< \text{Ready}, T_{Ready}^{AC}(N) >, < \text{Accept}, T_{Accept}^{AC}(N) >, < \text{Validity}, T_{Validity}^{AC}(N) >, < \text{Lock}, T_{Lock}^{AC}(N) >, \nonumber \\
< \text{PreCond}, T_{Pre}^{AC}(N) >, < \text{Process}, T_{Process}^{AC}(N) >, < \text{PostCond}, T_{Post}^{AC}(N) >, \nonumber \\
< \text{ReleaseLock}, T_{Release}^{AC}(N) >, < \text{Finish}, T_{Finish}^{AC}(N) > \nonumber 
\]

\[
T_{Finish}^{AC}(N) - T_{Ready}^{AC}(N) \leq \text{Deadline}^{AC} \hspace{1cm} (11)
\]
C.8 Interaction Between Periodic Consumer and Periodic Publisher or Aperiodic Publisher

The data dispatched by a publisher is asynchronously consumed by the periodic consumer. The timed trace for the interaction from the point of dispatch to the point of data validity check can be written as follows:

\[
\langle \text{Dispatch}, T^*_\text{Dispatch}(-, J) \rangle, \langle \text{Send}, T^\text{MT}_{\text{Send}}(-, K) \rangle, \langle \text{Receive}, T^\text{MT}_{\text{Receive}}(-, K) \rangle, \\
\langle \text{Ready}, T^\text{PC}_{\text{Ready}}(-, L) \rangle, \langle \text{Sample}, T^\text{PC}_{\text{Sample}}(-, L) \rangle, \langle \text{Validity}, T^\text{PC}_{\text{Validity}}(-, L) \rangle
\]

Here * matches both AP and PP. – for the first index implies that we are referring to the last execution of the process in the specified run of the hyper period. Also,

\[
L - J \leq 1 \quad \text{(12)}
\]

\[
L \geq K \geq J \quad \text{(13)}
\]

\[
T^\text{PC}_{\text{Validity}}(-, L) - T^*_\text{Dispatch}(-, J) \leq \text{Validity} \quad \text{(14)}
\]

i.e. there can be atmost one global hyper period difference between dispatch and sampling of the data at the consumer end. And, for nominal run the sampled data’s age should be less than the specified validity value.

C.9 Interaction Between Aperiodic Consumer and Periodic/Aperiodic Publisher

The data dispatched by a publisher is asynchronously consumed by the connected aperiodic consumer. The timed trace for the interaction from the point of dispatch to the point of data validity check can be written as follows:

\[
\langle \text{Dispatch}, T^*_\text{Dispatch}(-, J) \rangle, \langle \text{Send}, T^\text{MT}_{\text{Send}}(-, K) \rangle, \langle \text{Receive}, T^\text{MT}_{\text{Receive}}(-, K) \rangle, \\
\langle \text{Ready}, T^\text{PC}_{\text{Ready}}(-, K) \rangle, \langle \text{Accept}, T^\text{PC}_{\text{Sample}}(-, K) \rangle, \langle \text{Validity}, T^\text{AC}_{\text{Validity}}(-, K) \rangle
\]

Here * matches both AP and PP. – for the first index implies that we are referring to the last execution of the process in the specified run of the hyper period. Also,

\[
K - J \leq 1 \quad \text{(15)}
\]

\[
T^\text{AC}_{\text{Validity}}(-, K) - T^*_\text{Dispatch}(-, J) \leq \text{Validity} \quad \text{(16)}
\]

i.e. there can be atmost one global hyper period difference between dispatch and sampling of the data at the consumer end. And, for nominal run the sampled data’s age should be less than the specified validity value.

Now, we consider execution and interaction semantics of synchronous ports.

C.10 Synchronous (Blocking) Ports

A provided interface port contains the implementation for the methods defined in the provided interface and services the request issued on these interfaces from a connected requires port. Their interaction implies call-return semantics. As described earlier in the main text synchronous ports are always aperiodic. Each method in a synchronous port is executed on its own Aperiodic ARINC-653 Process. The key difference between this interaction from the similar interaction in CCM, is deadline monitoring.
C.10.1 Requires Port (RP)

Like aperiodic publishers, a process for requires port is set to ready state when some other process in the component invokes the corresponding method on the requires port. Figure 18 (g) shows sequence of activities that occur when the requires process is in the running state. It can be noticed that similar to aperiodic publisher, the requires port process does not need obtain a component lock as the invoking process already holds that lock and is blocked till the invoked process is finished. The key difference between aperiodic publisher and the requires port is that after dispatching the request, the requires port process blocks itself and waits to receive the corresponding response from a provides port. Once it receives the response, it accepts it, checks the postconditions, returns the response via shared memory to the invoking process and finishes up.

Note that unlike the interaction between asynchronous ports, communication over synchronous ports results in two pairs of dispatch, send and receive over two different communication channels\(^{10}\). The timed transition trace for nominal execution is given as:

\[
< \text{Ready}, T_{\text{Ready}}^\text{RP}(N) >, < \text{PreCond}, T_{\text{PreCond}}^\text{RP}(N) >, < \text{DispatchReq}, T_{\text{DispatchReq}}^\text{RP}(N) >, \\
< \text{Receive}, T_{\text{Receive}}^\text{MT} >, < \text{Accept}, T_{\text{AcceptRes}}^\text{RP}(N) >, < \text{PostCond}, T_{\text{Post}}^\text{RP}(N) >, \\
< \text{ReturnResponse}, T_{\text{RR}}^\text{RP}(N) >, < \text{Finish}, T_{\text{Finish}}^\text{RP}(N) >
\]

Here \( N \) is an index that counts the number of time the requires port process has been executed in the global hyper period.

\[
T_{\text{Finish}}^\text{RP}(N) - T_{\text{Ready}}^\text{RP}(N) \leq \text{Deadline}^\text{RP}
\]

Clearly the delay from dispatching the request, transmission of message across the network, processing of request on the provides port, and transmission of response back counts against the deadline of requires port.

C.10.2 Provides Port (PrP)

The behavior of provides port is similar to the behavior of an aperiodic consumer. Here also a trigger process, implemented in the ORB, is responsible for invoking the provides process by issuing the \text{Start} event when a request is received. If multiple request for the provides port exist, they are queued by at the receives end and serviced in FIFO. Figure 18 (h) shows the sequence of activities inside the running state of a provides port process. Key differences between this port and aperiodic consumer are that provides port process does not check the age of incoming data and that it also acts as an aperiodic publisher and dispatches the response to be transmitted by the communication channel. The timed transition trace for this port can be written as:

\[
< \text{Ready}, T_{\text{Ready}}^\text{PrP}(N) >, < \text{Accept}, T_{\text{Accept}}^\text{PrP}(N) >, < \text{Lock}, T_{\text{Lock}}^\text{PrP}(N) >, \\
< \text{PreCond}, T_{\text{PreCond}}^\text{PrP}(N) >, < \text{Process}, T_{\text{Process}}^\text{PrP}(N) >, < \text{PostCond}, T_{\text{Post}}^\text{PrP}(N) >, \\
< \text{ReleaseLock}, T_{\text{Release}}^\text{PrP}(N) >, < \text{DispatchResponse}, T_{\text{DispatchRes}}^\text{PrP}(N) >, < \text{Finish}, T_{\text{Finish}}^\text{PrP}(N) >
\]

\[
T_{\text{Finish}}^\text{PrP}(N) - T_{\text{Ready}}^\text{PrP}(N) \leq \text{Deadline}^\text{PrP}
\]

C.10.3 Interaction Between Provides and Requires Port

The full interaction timed trace for these ports can be written as follows.

\(^{10}\)As described earlier, a communication channel can have only one source, but multiple destinations
That is the full interaction between these ports finishes within one global hyper period. And, the timed trigger schedule for message transmission on these channels is such that the cumulative delay encountered in both message transfers is still less than the deadline of the requires port.

Moreover, the deadline of the requires port must be less than the deadline of the process that invoked it, which is required by the constraint of the trigger pattern, see equation 1.
D TFPG Templates for Component Interactions

TFPG - Templates
------------------
The following is a superset of the TFPG entities. Each component port is populated with a subset of these entities.

1) INDICES
-------

1.1) FAILURE-MODE
------------------
The list of possible failure modes and their associated codes
'LP' - 'LOCK_PROBLEM' (is common for all the interfaces in a component)
'VF' - 'VALIDITY'
'PREF' - 'PRECONDITION'
'UCF' - 'USER_CODE'
'POSTF' - 'POSTCONDITION'
'DV' - 'DEADLINE'

1.2) ALARM
-----------
The list of possible alarms and their codes
'LTF' - 'LOCK_TIMEOUT_FAILURE'
'VF' - 'VALIDITY_FAILURE'
'PREF' - 'PRECONDITION_FAILURE'
'UCF' - 'USER_CODE_FAILURE'
'POSTF' - 'POSTCONDITION_FAILURE'
'DV' - 'DEADLINE_VIOLATION'
'SI' - 'SILENT'

1.3) MODE-VARIABLE
-------------------
The list of possible mode variables and their codes
'LTR' - 'LOCK_TIMEOUT_RESPONSE'
'VR' - 'VALIDITY_RESPONSE'
'PRER' - 'PRECONDITION_RESPONSE'
'UCR' - 'USER_CODE_RESPONSE'
'POSTR' - 'POSTCONDITION_RESPONSE'
'DVR' - 'DEADLINE_VIOLATION_RESPONSE'
'SIR' - 'SILENT_RESPONSE'

1.4) HM_RESPONSE (Set of all possible Mode-Values across all Mode-Variables)
---------------------------
The list of possible responses (mode-values) from component health manager
'RI' - 'IGNORE'
'RA' - 'ABORT'
'RS' - 'STOP'
'RR' - 'RESTART'
'RSU' - 'SUSPEND'
'RUPD' - 'USE_PAST_DATA'

1.5) MODE_VALUES per MODE-VARIABLE (The first value is the initial mode)
----------------------------
The list of possible modes-values per mode-variable

'LTR' - ['RA', 'RI']
'VR' - ['RUPD', 'RA']
'PRER' - ['RI', 'RA']
'UCR' - ['RI', 'RA']
'POSTR' - ['RI', 'RA']
'DVR' - ['RI', 'RR', 'RS']
'SIR' - ['RI', 'RA']

1.6) SILENT_OUTPUT_DISCS
-------------------
The list of possible unmonitored output discrepancy ports

'NDP' - 'NO DATA PUBLISHED'
'LDP' - 'LATE DATA PUBLISHED'
'IDP' - 'INVALID DATA PUBLISHED'
'IS' - 'INVALID STATE'
'LSU' - 'LATE STATE UPDATE'
'MSU' - 'MISSING STATE UPDATE'
'IRD' - 'INVALID RETURN DATA'
'LRD' - 'LATE RETURN DATA'
'NRD' - 'NO RETURN DATA'
'IID' - 'INVALID INPUT DATA'
'NIO' - 'NOT INVOKED OUT'

1.7) SILENT_INPUT_DISCS
-------------------
The list of possible unmonitored input discrepancy ports.

'LTI' - 'LOCK_TIME_OUT_FAILURE_IN'
'BDI' - 'BAD_DATA_IN'
'NDPI' - 'NO_DATA_PUBLISHED_IN'
'VFI' - 'VALIDITY_FAILURE_IN'
'IRDPI' - 'INVALID_RETURN_DATA_FROM_PROVIDES_IN'
'LRDPI' - 'LATE_RETURN_DATA_FROM_PROVIDES_IN'
'NII' - 'NOT INVOKED IN'
'BRFR' - 'BAD RESULT FROM REQUIRES'
'LRFR' - 'LATE RESULT FROM REQUIRES'

1.8) DISCREPANCY ASSOCIATED WITH STATE VARIABLES
------------------------------------------------
Each State variable in the component gets an associated discrepancy
$State_Name + "_BAD_STATE" -

2.) FORWARD PROPAGATION WITHIN INTERFACE
--------------------------------------------
The forward propagation links described below will happen if the source and destination Discrepancy (monitored / unmonitored) are present within the TFPG associated with the concerned interface. The forward propagation includes propagation from
- Failure Mode to Monitored Discrepancy (Alarm)
- Un-monitored Input Discrepancy to a Monitored Discrepancy (Alarm)
- Monitored Discrepancy (Alarm)
- one Monitored Discrepancy (Alarm) to another Monitored Discrepancy (Alarm) i.e. Cascade effect
- Un-monitored Input Discrepancy to to Un-monitored Output Discrepancy
2.1) FORWARD PROPAGATION (FROM ALARM TO OUTPUT-PORT)
-------------------------------
For each alarm, the possible down-stream paths within a component is captured.

'LT' -> 'NDP' / 'NIO' / 'MSU' ('RA')

'VF' -> 'IS' ('RUPD')
'VF' -> 'MSU' / 'NIO' ('RA')

'PREF' -> 'IDP' / 'IS' ('RI')
'PREF' -> 'NDP' / 'MSU' / 'NIO' ('RA')
'PREF' -> 'IRD' ('RI' provides)
'PREF' -> 'IID' ('RI' requires)
'PREF' -> 'NRD' ('RA' - provides)

'SI' -> 'MSU' / 'NDP' / 'NIO'

'UCF' -> 'IS' / 'IDP' / 'IRD' ('RI' if UCF is monitored else none)
'UCF' -> 'MSU' / 'NDP' / 'NIO' ('RA' if UCF is monitored else none)

'POSTF' -> 'IDP' / 'IS' / 'IRD'

'DV' -> 'NDP' / 'MSU' / 'NRD' / 'NIO' ('RS')
'DV' -> 'LDP' / 'LSU' ('RI' / 'RR')

2.2) CASCADE-EFFECT WITHIN COMPONENT (ALARM TO ALARM)
-------------------------------

'LT' -> 'DV' ('RI')
'PREF' -> 'UCF' ('RI')
'PREF' -> 'POSTF' ('RI')
'PREF' -> 'DV' ('RI')
'UCF' -> 'POSTF' ('RI')
'UCF' -> 'DV' ('RI')
'VF' -> 'PREF' ('RUPD')
'VF' -> 'UCF' ('RUPD')
'VF' -> 'POSTF' ('RUPD')

2.3) FORWARD PROPAGATION FROM INPUT-PORT (DISCREPANCY) TO ALARM
-------------------------------

'LT' -> 'LT'
'VF' -> 'VF'
'BDF' -> 'PREF'
'BDF' -> 'UCF'
'BRFR' -> 'UCF'
'IRDPI' -> 'UCF'
'LRDPI' -> 'UCF'
'BDFR' -> 'POSTF'
'IRDPI' -> 'POSTF'
'LRFR' -> 'DV'
'NII' -> 'SI'

2.4) FORWARD PROPAGATION FROM FAILURE-MODE TO ALARM
-------------------------------
2.5) FORWARD PROPAGATION FROM INPUT-PORT to OUTPUT-PORT
----------------------------------------------------
'LRFR' -> 'LDP'/'LSU'/'LRD'
'NII' -> 'NIO'/'NII'/'MSU'/'IS'
'BRFR' -> 'IID'
'BDI' -> 'IID'

3) FORWARD PROPAGATION ACROSS INTERFACES
-----------------------------------------------
These forward propagation described below happen across interface boundaries (from output port of one to input port of another). While the forward propagation associated with invokes-connection happen within the component, the rest are across component boundaries.

3.1) FAILURE PROPAGATION FROM PUBLISHER TO CONSUMER
--------------------------------------------------
'IDP' -> 'BDI'
'NIO' -> 'NII'
'NDP' -> 'NII'
'NDP' -> 'VFI'
'LDP' -> 'VFI'
'LDP' -> 'BDI'

3.2) FAILURE PROPAGATION IN SYNCHRONOUS CALL (FROM REQUIRES TO PROVIDES AND BACK)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
'NIO' -> 'NII' (REQUIRES TO PROVIDES)
'IID' -> 'BDI' (REQUIRES TO PROVIDES)
'IRD' -> 'IRDPI' (PROVIDES TO REQUIRES)
'LRD' -> 'LRDPI' (PROVIDES TO REQUIRES)

3.3) FAILURE PROPAGATION WHILE INVOKING REQUIRES INTERFACE (FROM REQUIRES CLIENT TO REQUIRES AND BACK)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
'NIO' -> 'NII' (REQUIRES-CLIENT TO REQUIRES)
'NRD' -> 'BRFR' (REQUIRES TO REQUIRES-CLIENT)
'IRD' -> 'BRFR' (REQUIRES TO REQUIRES-CLIENT)
'Lrd' -> 'LRFR' (REQUIRES TO REQUIRES-CLIENT)

3.4) FAILURE PROPAGATION RESULTING FROM INVOKE CONNECTION
----------------------------------------------------------
'NIO' -> 'NII' (CLIENT TO SERVER)

4) PROPAGATION WITHIN COMPONENT
-------------------------------
This section captures the failure propagations associated with a component. These include failure propagation from Lock-Problem Failure mode, propagations to and from BAD_State discrepancies.

4.1) FAILURE-MODE
- Each Component has a failure mode for Lock Problems - 'LTF' FAILURE MODE

4.2) DISCREPANCY (STATE)

There is a discrepancy for each state in the component - '_BAD_STATE' DISCREPANCY

4.3) LOCK-TIME-OUT

Connect component 'LTF' to 'LTI' of each interface in component. 'LTF'->'LTI'

4.4) BAD_STATE PROPAGATION BASED ON 'READS' CONNECTION

CONNECT THE APPROPRIATE _BAD_STATE DISCREPANCY TO BDI
$STATE_NAME + '_BAD_STATE'->'BDI'

4.5) BAD_STATE PROPAGATION BASED ON 'UPDATES' CONNECTION

CONNECT TO APPROPRIATE _BAD_STATE DISCREPANCY
'NDP'/LDP',/IDP'/IS'/LSU'/MSU'/IRD'/L RD'/N RD'-->$STATE_NAME + '_BAD_STATE'