@article{1146,
  keywords = {Cyber-physical system security, Manufacturing security, Counterfeit detection, Supply chain security, Real-time verification, Distributed supply chains},
  author = {Michael Sandborn and Carlos Olea and Jules White and Chris Williams and Pablo Tarazaga and Logan Sturm and Mohammad Albakri and Charles Tenney},
  title = {Towards secure cyber-physical information association for parts},
  abstract = {Counterfeiting is a significant problem for safety-critical systems, since cyber-information, such as a quality control certification, may be passed off with a flawed counterfeit part. Safety-critical systems, such as planes, are at risk because cyber-information cannot be provably tied to a specific physical part instance (e.g., impeller). This paper presents promising initial work showing that using piezoelectric sensors to measure impedance identities of parts may serve as a physically unclonable function that can produce unclonable part instance identities. When one of these impedance identities is combined with cyber-information and signed using existing public key infrastructure approaches, it creates a provable binding of cyber-information to a specific part instance. Our initial results from experimentation with traditionally and additively manufactured parts indicate that it will be extremely expensive and improbable for an attacker to counterfeit a part that replicates the impedance signature of a legitimate part.},
  year = {2021},
  journal = {Journal of Manufacturing Systems},
  volume = {59},
  pages = {27-41},
  month = {04/2021},
  issn = {0278-6125},
  url = {https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0278612521000030},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmsy.2021.01.003},
}